This paper illuminates the history and design process of the various President’s Flags of the United States of America between 1915 and 1959, in particular focusing on the efforts to produce such a banner for President Harry S. Truman in 1945.

Although the concept of intelligence is difficult to define, research has provided evidence for a significant genetic component. Attempts are now being made to use molecular genetic approaches to identify genes contributing to intelligence, and to determine the ways in which they interact with environmental variables. This research is then likely to determine the developmental pathways of intelligence, in an effort to understand mental handicap and learning disorders and develop new treatment strategies. This paper reviews research on the genetic basis (...) of intelligence, and discusses the ethical concerns, including the role of genetic information, the value we place on intelligence and the allocation of resources. It will be argued that the objections raised are problematic, and that because of the value of this knowledge and the prospect of improving lives, this research is morally required. We will then provide a brief analysis of the issues raised by enhancement of intelligence using genetic technology, and will argue that there is no intrinsic difference between this and other means of optimising intelligence. (shrink)

This paper reports the results of a pilot study of differences in ethical evaluations between business faculty and students at a Southern university. Data were collected from 137 business students (46 freshmen and 67 seniors) and 34 business faculty members. Significant differences were found in 7 of the 30 situations between freshmen and faculty and four situations between seniors and faculty. When the combined means for each group were tested, there was no significant difference in the means at the 0.05 (...) level of significance. A trend was revealed, however, in that the majority of the time faculty members were the most ethically oriented followed by seniors and then freshmen. (shrink)

Philosophers such as Robert Nozick have argued that knowledge must be sensitive, in roughly the sense that if what one knew had been false, one would not have believed it. Such a counterfactual constraint has been used to explain the appeal of scepticism. This chapter argues that no version of the constraint is correct. It also criticizes the variant of Nozick's approach developed by Keith DeRose on which the standard for the application of the word ‘know’ depends on the (...) conversational context. A version of the argument given by Hilary Putnam that if one was a brain in a vat, one could not think that one was constructed using perceptual demonstrative expressions. (shrink)

0. Logic is sometimes conceived as metaphysically neutral, so that nothing controversial in metaphysics is logically valid. That conception devastates logic. Just about every putative principle of logic has been contested on metaphysical grounds. According to some, future contingencies violate the law of excluded middle; according to others, the set of all sets that are not members of themselves makes a contradiction true. Even the structural principle that chaining together valid arguments yields a valid argument has been rejected in response (...) to sorites paradoxes. In each case, a deviant metaphysics corresponds to the deviant logic. Of course, if one is trying to persuade deviant metaphysicians of the error of their ways, one is unlikely to get far by relying on logical principles that they reject. But that obvious dialectical exigency stably marks out no realm of logic. Each logical principle has persuasive force in some dialectical contexts and not in others. We do better to admit that logic has metaphysically contentious implications, and embrace them ─ if we know what they are. (shrink)

In Suppose and Tell, Williamson makes a new and original attempt to defend the material conditional account of indicative conditionals. His overarching argument is that this account offers the best explanation of the data concerning how people evaluate and use such conditionals. We argue that Williamson overlooks several important alternative explanations, some of which appear to explain the relevant data at least as well as, or even better than, the material conditional account does. Along the way, we also (...) show that Williamson errs at important junctures about what exactly the relevant data are. (shrink)

Although not universally accepted at the time, the atomic hypothesis during the 19th century provided a definite ordering scheme for certain relatively sophisticated chemical phenomena. As such, it was conceptually responsible for the formulation and precise articulation of important seminal ideas in chemical studies. In this paper we will explore this claim with regard to the views of the British chemist Alexander W. Williamson.

In several texts, Kant announces that there are three distinct mental faculties: cognition, desire, and feeling. This trinitarian commitment should give us pause, for many people operate instead with a dualist model of reason and emotion, where desire and feeling are usually squished together under emotion. Here, as elsewhere, the Kantian model is more complicated. On Kant's view, each of the three faculties has its own specific work to do and generates its own kinds of representations. We do not simply (...) have emotions that... (shrink)

ABSTRACT This essay defends a qualified version of Quine's thesis of universal revisability against Chalmers's recent conditionalization-based criticisms of it. It is argued that an embodied view of cognitive processing undermines Chalmers's account of nonrevisable a priori justification, which presupposes that concepts prefigure the confirmation-relations into which they enter, so as to make such relations rationally accessible to anyone who possesses those concepts. On the view developed here, bodily interaction with the world and the accompanying subconscious processing can change subjects' (...) dispositions to apply their concepts, in ways that are not rationally accessible to them, even given a complete description of that interaction, and do not constitute a change in the content of the concepts involved. Thus a subject who treats a proposition as indefeasibly justified a priori might nevertheless significantly lower her credence in that proposition, in ways that are not accessible to the subject on the basis of her grasp of the content of the relevant concepts. This discussion has further implications concerning the role of the a priori in the philosophical enterprise. (shrink)

Audi defends his views in epistemology against the challenges raised by Laurence BonJour, Timothy Williamson, and William Alston in Part II, “Knowledge, Justification, and Acceptance.” Specifically, Audi addresses his concerns about the sorts of beliefs that can be noninferentially justified, the sense in which the grounds of justification may be internal, and the range of attitudes that admit of justification and rationality.

I argue against ‘right reason’ style accounts of how we should manage our beliefs in the face of higher-order evidence. I start from the observation that such views seem to have bad practical consequences when we imagine someone acting on them. I then catalogs ways that Williamson, Weatherson, and Lasonen-Aarnio have tried to block objections based on these consequences; I argue all fail. I then move on to offer my own theoretical picture of a rational ‘should believe,’ and show (...) that, if such a picture is right, it can neatly explain why right reason isn't. I close by arguing that the extent to which anti-luminosity arguments motivate right reason has been overstated; the positive picture developed here, despite rejecting right reason, is nonetheless consistent with luminosity failures. (shrink)

Contingentism is the view that it is contingent which things exist. Despite its plausibility, advocates of contingentism face a well-known ‘challenge’ to demonstrate that they can draw what appear to be intelligible modal distinctions (Williamson Modal Logic as Metaphysics. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013). In this article, I argue that if certain controversial modal principles fail, the challenge contingentists face becomes much more difficult. Whereas extant challenges concern contingentists’ inability to draw quite theoretical second-order modal distinctions, I present a (...) challenge which concerns contingentists’ inability to draw simpler first-order distinctions. This indicates that in certain modal settings there may well be significant first-order barriers to maintaining contingentism. (shrink)

This paper considers what distinguishes speech acts such as asserting, stating and claiming from related ones such as suggesting, hinting and conversationally implicating. The distinction cannot be that assertion et al. have a word-to-world direction of fit, since suggesting, hinting, etc., do so as well. The same point applies to attempting to draw the distinction in terms of intentions to induce beliefs, etc. Our proposal, drawing on important ideas from Dummett and Williamson, is that assertion is intimately tied to (...) declara­tive sentences, and to the knowledge norm -albeit in a more roundabout way than they imagined. In particular, declaratives are those devices purpose-built to trigger the knowledge norm; and to assert is to achieve the level of norma­tive commitment, “normative risk”, that one would have achieved had one used a declarative. (shrink)

This special issue of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy is dedicated to Timothy Williamson's work on modality. It consists of a new paper by Williamson followed by papers on Williamson's work on modality, with each followed by a reply by Williamson. -/- Contributors: Andrew Bacon, Kit Fine, Peter Fritz, Jeremy Goodman, John Hawthorne, Øystein Linnebo, Ted Sider, Robert Stalnaker, Meghan Sullivan, Gabriel Uzquiano, Barbara Vetter, Timothy Williamson, Juhani Yli-Vakkuri.

For over thirty years, Robert Audi has produced important work in ethics, epistemology, and the theory of action. This volume features thirteen new critical essays on Audi by a distinguished group of authors: Fred Adams, William Alston, Laurence BonJour, Roger Crisp, Elizabeth Fricker, Bernard Gert, Thomas Hurka, Hugh McCann, Al Mele, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Raimo Tuomela, Candace Vogler, and Timothy Williamson. Audi's introductory essay provides a thematic overview interconnecting his views in ethics, epistemology, and philosophy of action. The volume (...) concludes with his comprehensive response essay that yields an illuminating dialog with all his critics and often extends his previous work. (shrink)

This paper is a study of higher-order contingentism – the view, roughly, that it is contingent what properties and propositions there are. We explore the motivations for this view and various ways in which it might be developed, synthesizing and expanding on work by Kit Fine, Robert Stalnaker, and Timothy Williamson. Special attention is paid to the question of whether the view makes sense by its own lights, or whether articulating the view requires drawing distinctions among possibilities that, (...) according to the view itself, do not exist to be drawn. The paper begins with a non-technical exposition of the main ideas and technical results, which can be read on its own. This exposition is followed by a formal investigation of higher-order contingentism, in which the tools of variable-domain intensional model theory are used to articulate various versions of the view, understood as theories formulated in a higher-order modal language. Our overall assessment is mixed: higher-order contingentism can be fleshed out into an elegant systematic theory, but perhaps only at the cost of abandoning some of its original motivations. (shrink)

Timothy Williamson has provided damaging counterexamples to Robert Nozick’s sensitivity principle. The examples are based on Williamson’s anti-luminosity arguments, and they show how knowledge requires a margin for error that appears to be incompatible with sensitivity. I explain how Nozick can rescue sensitivity from Williamson’s counterexamples by appeal to a specific conception of the methods by which an agent forms a belief. I also defend the proposed conception of methods against Williamson’s criticisms.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:...

Knowledge closure is, roughly, the following claim: For every agent S and propositions P and Q, if S knows P, knows that P implies Q, and believes Q because it is so implied, then S knows Q. Almost every epistemologist believes that closure is true. Indeed, they often believe that it so obviously true that any theory implying its denial is thereby refuted. Some prominent epistemologists have nevertheless denied it, most famously Fred Dretske and Robert Nozick. There are closure (...) advocates who see other virtues in those accounts, however, and so who introduce revisions of one sort or another in order to preserve closure while maintaining their spirit. One popular approach is to replace the “sensitivity” constraint at the heart of both of those accounts with a “safety” constraint, as advocated by Timothy Williamson, Duncan Pritchard, Ernest Sosa, Stephen Luper, and others. The purpose of this essay is to show that this approach does not succeed: safety does not save closure. And neither does a popular variation on the safety theme, the safe-basis or safe-indicator account. (shrink)

Facts about justification are not brute facts. They are epistemic facts that depend upon more fundamental non-epistemic facts. Internalists about justification often argue for mentalism, which claims that facts about justification supervene upon one’s non-factive mental states, using Lehrer and Cohen’s :191–207, 1983) New Evil Demon Problem. The New Evil Demon Problem tells you to imagine yourself the victim of a Cartesian demon who deceives you about what the external world is like, and then asks whether you nevertheless have justification (...) for your beliefs about the external world. Internalists and externalists agree that there is something that is epistemically good or valuable about both your actual beliefs and your beliefs in the demon scenario. Internalists claim that the epistemic property which these sets of beliefs share most intuitively should be thought of as sameness of justification. Externalists, on the other hand, reject this claim, usually either by challenging the internalist intuition directly, or by arguing that there is a more plausible way to think about the epistemic property in question. Recently, both kinds of externalist objection have been raised against the argument from the New Evil Demon Problem for mentalism. The goal of this paper is to defend the argument against three prominent objections—a pair of which is offered by Littlejohn :399–434, 2009) and one by Williamson Rationality and the good: critical essays on the ethics and epistemology of Robert Audi, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007; in: Dutant J, Dohrn D The new evil demon, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016). (shrink)

Starting from John MacFarlane's recent survey of answers to the question ‘What is assertion?’, I defend an account of assertion that draws on elements of MacFarlane's and Robert Brandom's commitment accounts, Timothy Williamson's knowledge norm account, and my own previous work on the normative status of logic. I defend the knowledge norm from recent attacks. Indicative conditionals, however, pose a problem when read along the lines of Ernest Adams' account, an account supported by much work in the psychology (...) of reasoning. Furthermore, there seems to be no place for degrees of belief in the accounts of belief and assertion given here. Degrees of belief do have a role in decision‐making, but, again, there is much evidence that the orthodox theory of subjective utility maximization is not a good description of what we do in decision‐making and, arguably, neither is it a good normative guide to how we ought to make decisions. (shrink)

This paper contributes to a growing body of literature analyzing the social responsibilities of SMEs (Sarbutts, 2003, Journal of Communication Management 7(4), 340-347; Castka et al., 2004, Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management 11, 140-149; Enderle, 2004, Business Ethics: A European Review 14(1), 51-63; Fuller and Tian, 2006, Journal of Business Ethics 67, 287-304; Jenkins, 2006, Journal of Business Ethics 67, 241-256; Lepoutre and Heene, 2006, Journal of Business Ethics 67, 257-273; Roberts, 2003, Journal of Business Ethics 44(2), 159-170; (...) class='Hi'>Williamson et al., 2006, Journal of Business Ethics 67, 317-330) by designing a conceptual framework based on the Strategic Management Theory, which links social issues to the creation of sustained competitive advantages for SMEs. Firstly, the paper reviews literature on corporate social responsibility (CSR) and especially on the creation of social capital for SMEs. An exploration of Strategic Management Theory follows, focusing on the Positioning and Competence Based Schools, with the objective to find an answer to the question: how do social and environmental issues fit in the logic of creation of competitive advantage and what role do they play during strategic planning? The contributions of Hart (natural resourced based view) and Porter and Kramer (development of strategic intent in social responsible actions) are then related to the framework of possible growth paths of SMEs (Hong and Jeong, 2006, Journal of Enterprise Information Management 19(3), 292-302) in order to answer this question. Strategies that could trigger or lever these growth paths are then discussed. Following the recommendation Thompson and Smith (1991, Journal of Small Business Management 29(1), 30-44) gave to focus on the "study of CSR behaviors instead of perceptions," a medium-sized Austrian company in the food producing industry has been identified for an exploratory case study analysis to test the applicability of this theoretical framework for the description of the actual responsible business behavior (RBB) of an SME. This company is typical of one of the 250.000 SMEs which account for 99.6% of the Austrian economy. Based on the findings and the discussion, this paper presents a strategic planning tool for SMEs aiming to embed RBB into the corporate strategy. (shrink)

In Back to the Dance Itself, Sondra Fraleigh edits essays that illuminate how scholars apply a range of phenomenologies to explore questions of dance and the world; performing life and language; body and place; and self-knowing in performance. Some authors delve into theoretical perspectives, while others relate personal experiences and reflections that reveal fascinating insights arising from practice. Collectively, authors give particular consideration to the interactive lifeworld of making and doing that motivates performance. Their texts and photographs study body and (...) the environing world through points of convergence, as correlates in elemental and constant interchange modeled vividly in dance. Selected essays on eco-phenomenology and feminism extend this view to the importance of connections with, and caring for, all life. Contributors: Karen Barbour, Christine Bellerose, Robert Bingham, Kara Bond, Hillel Braude, Sondra Fraleigh, Kimerer LaMothe, Joanna McNamara, Vida Midgelow, Ami Shulman, and Amanda Williamson. (shrink)

Sensitivity and safety are modal concepts of knowledge. A person’s belief that p is sensitive if and only if in the closest possible world where p is false S does not believe that p. A person’s belief that p is safe if and only if in most near-by possible worlds in which S continues to form her belief that p in the same way as in the actual world the belief continues to be true. Robert Nozick claims that sensitivity (...) is a necessary condition for knowledge. Ernest Sosa, Timothy Williamson and Duncan Pritchard argue among others that safety is necessary for knowledge. I shall contest both views by offering counterexamples of persons, to whom it is highly plausible to ascribe knowledge although their beliefs are neither sensitive nor safe. I conclude that neither sensitivity nor safety is a necessary condition for knowledge and that insensitive and unsafe knowledge exists. (shrink)

Resumo: Mesmo que neguemos qualquer tipo de excepcionalismo à filosofia como empreendimento intelectual (ver Williamson, 2007), parece fácil conceder que, pelo menos no que diz respeito às relações com sua própria história, a filosofia é diferente de outros campos do conhecimento (ver Williamson, 2018). No entanto, questões relacionadas ao escopo, papel e validade da história da filosofia para a atividade filosófica são tão antigas quanto a própria filosofia, além de se tornarem relevantes no chamado parting of ways entre (...) as tendências analítica e hermenêutico-fenomenológica. No entanto, é possível dizer que, pelo menos desde a segunda metade do último século, temos visto uma inflexão importante sobre o lugar e a importância da história da filosofia na filosofia contemporânea: tanto por causa da “virada histórica” na filosofia analítica, com obras de Strawson, Sellars e, mais recentemente, Brandom, servindo como bons exemplos desse movimento, quanto pelo interesse recentemente renovado em questões de metafilosofia. Um exemplo desse segundo movimento é o debate entre os chamados apropriacionistas e os contextualistas. Portanto, este artigo tem como objetivo analisar os dois principais argumentos contra as reconstruções racionais - o GTRC e a acusação de anacronismo - e oferecer uma defesa de uma abordagem inferencialista para a história da filosofia, com base no trabalho de Robert Brandom, que é simultaneamente aberto a certo contextualismo, bem como estabelece parâmetros para as reconstruções racionais. (shrink)

An introduction to the special issue on epistemic logic and the foundations of game theory edited by Michael Bacharach and Philippe Mongin. Contributors are Michael Bacharach, Robert Stalnaker, Salvatore Modica and Aldo Rustichini, Luc Lismont and Philippe Mongin, and Hyun-Song Shin and Timothy Williamson.

An exploration of the theories, histories, practices, and contradictions of liberalism today. What does it mean to be a liberal in neoliberal times? This collection of short essays attempts to show how liberals and the wider concept of liberalism remain relevant in what many perceive to be a highly illiberal age. Liberalism in the broader sense revolves around tolerance, progress, humanitarianism, objectivity, reason, democracy, and human rights. Liberalism's emphasis on individual rights opened a theoretical pathway to neoliberalism, through private property, (...) a classically minimal liberal state, and the efficiency of “free markets.” In practice, neoliberalism is associated less with the economic deregulation championed by its advocates than the re-regulation of the economy to protect financial capital. Liberalism in Neoliberal Times engages with the theories, histories, practices, and contradictions of liberalism, viewing it in relation to four central areas of public life: human rights, ethnicity and gender, education, and the media. The contributors explore the transformations in as well as the transformative aspects of liberalism and highlight both its liberating and limiting capacities. The book contends that liberalism—in all its forms—continues to underpin specific institutions such as the university, the free press, the courts, and, of course, parliamentary democracy. Liberal ideas are regularly mobilized in areas such as counterterrorism, minority rights, privacy, and the pursuit of knowledge. This book contends that while we may not agree on much, we can certainly agree that an understanding of liberalism and its emancipatory capacity is simply too important to be left to the liberals Contributors Alejandro Abraham-Hamanoiel, Patrick Ainley, Abdullahi An-Na'im, Michael Bailey, Haim Bresheeth, Başak Çalı, David Chandler, William Davies, Costas Douzinas, Natalie Fenton, Des Freedman, Roberto Gargarella, Priyamvada Gopal, Jonathan Hardy, John Holmwood, Ratna Kapur, Gholam Khiabany, Ray Kiely, Monika Krause, Deepa Kumar, Arun Kundnani, Colin Leys, Howard Littler, Kathleen Lynch, Robert W. McChesney, Nivedita Menon, Toby Miller, Kate Nash, Joan Pedro-Carañana, Julian Petley, Anne Phillips, Jonathan Rosenhead, Annabelle Sreberny, John Steel, Michael Wayne, Milly Williamson. (shrink)

Things could have been different, but could it also have been different what things there are? It is natural to think so, since I could have failed to be born, and it is natural to think that I would then not have been anything. But what about entities like propositions, properties and relations? Had I not been anything, would there have been the property of being me? In this thesis, I formally develop and assess views according to which it is (...) both contingent what individuals there are and contingent what propositions, properties and relations there are. I end up rejecting these views, and conclude that even if it is contingent what individuals there are, it is necessary what propositions, properties and relations there are. -/- Call the view that it is contingent what individuals there are first-order contingentism, and the view that it is contingent what propositions, properties and relations there are higher-order contingentism. I bring together the three major contributions to the literature on higher-order contingentism, which have been developed largely independently of each other, by Kit Fine, Robert Stalnaker, and Timothy Williamson. I show that a version of Stalnaker's approach to higher-order contingentism was already explored in much more technical detail by Fine, and that it stands up well to the major challenges against higher-order contingentism posed by Williamson. -/- I further show that once a mistake in Stalnaker's development is corrected, each of his models of contingently existing propositions corresponds to the propositional fragment of one of Fine's more general models of contingently existing propositions, properties and relations, and vice versa. I also show that Stalnaker's theory of contingently existing propositions is in tension with his own theory of counterfactuals, but not with one of the main competing theories, proposed by David Lewis. -/- Finally, I connect higher-order contingentism to expressive power arguments against first-order contingentism. I argue that there are intelligible distinctions we draw with talk about "possible things", such as the claim that there are uncountably many possible stars. Since first-order contingentists hold that there are no possible stars apart from the actual stars, they face the challenge of paraphrasing such talk. I show that even in an infinitary higher-order modal logic, the claim that there are uncountably many possible stars can only be paraphrased if higher-order contingentism is false. I therefore conclude that even if first-order contingentism is true, higher-order contingentism is false. (shrink)

This latest volume of _The Philosopher's Annual_ presents the ten best articles published in the field during 2001. No limitations are placed on the articles' sources, subject matter or mode of treatment, providing for a diverse collection of engaging, high-caliber work that stands as a valuable sample of contemporary philosophy. This year's volume includes papers by Robert Bernasconi, Hans Halvorson, Christopher Hitchcock, Ignacio Jane, Brian Leiter, Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel, Joel Pust, Alison Simmons, Jason Stanley and Timothy (...) class='Hi'>Williamson, and Crispin Wright. (shrink)

Logic and Knowledge -/- Editor: Carlo Cellucci, Emily Grosholz and Emiliano Ippoliti Date Of Publication: Aug 2011 Isbn13: 978-1-4438-3008-9 Isbn: 1-4438-3008-9 -/- The problematic relation between logic and knowledge has given rise to some of the most important works in the history of philosophy, from Books VI–VII of Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s Prior and Posterior Analytics, to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and Mill’s A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive. It provides the title of an important collection of papers (...) by Bertrand Russell (Logic and Knowledge. Essays, 1901–1950). However, it has remained an underdeveloped theme in the last century, because logic has been treated as separate from knowledge. -/- This book does not hope to make up for a century-long absence of discussion. Rather, its ambition is to call attention to the theme and stimulating renewed reflection upon it. The book collects essays of leading figures in the field and it addresses the theme as a topic of current debate, or as a historical case study, or when appropriate as both. Each essay is followed by the comments of a younger discussant, in an attempt to transform what might otherwise appear as a monologue into an ongoing dialogue; each section begins with an historical essay and ends with an essay by one of the editors. -/- Carlo Cellucci is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Rome ‘La Sapienza,’ Italy. He is currently completing a book entitled, Remaking Logic: What is Logic Really? -/- Emily Grosholz is Professor of Philosophy at the Pennsylvania State University, USA. She is the author of Representation and Productive Ambiguity in Mathematics and the Sciences (Oxford University Press, 2007). -/- Emiliano Ippoliti is a Research Fellow at the University of Rome ‘La Sapienza,’ Italy. His main interests are heuristics, the logic of discovery, and problem-solving. He is currently working on a book, Ampliating Knowledge: Data, Hypotheses and Novelty. -/- TABLE OF CONTENTS -/- Foreword .................................................................................................... ix Acknowledgements ................................................................................. xxv -/- Section I: Logic and Knowledge -/- Chapter One................................................................................................. 3 The Cognitive Importance of Sight and Hearing in Seventeenthand Eighteenth-Century Logic (Mirella Capozzi) Discussion .............................................................................................. 26 (Chiara Fabbrizi) Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 33 Nominalistic Content (Jody Azzouni) Discussion ............................................................................................... 52 (Silvia De Bianchi) Chapter Three ............................................................................................ 57 A Garden of Grounding Trees (Göran Sundholm) Discussion.......................................................................................... .. 75 (Luca Incurvati) Chapter Four .............................................................................................. 81 Logics and Metalogics (Timothy Williamson) Discussion.......................................................................................... 101 (Cesare Cozzo) Chapter Five ............................................................................................ 109 Is Knowledge the Most General Factive Stative Attitude? (Cesare Cozzo) Discussion.......................................................................................... 117 (Timothy Williamson) Chapter Six .............................................................................................. 123 Classifying and Justifying Inference Rules (Carlo Cellucci) Discussion.......................................................................................... 143 (Norma B. Goethe) -/- Section II: Logic and Science -/- Chapter Seven.......................................................................................... 151 The Universal Generalization Problem and the Epistemic Status of Ancient Medicine: Aristotle and Galen (Riccardo Chiaradonna) Discussion.......................................................................................... 168 (Diana Quarantotto) Chapter Eight........................................................................................... 175 The Empiricist View of Logic (Donald Gillies) Discussion.......................................................................................... 191 (Paolo Pecere) Chapter Nine............................................................................................ 197 Artificial Intelligence and Evolutionary Theory: Herbert Simon’s Unifying Framework (Roberto Cordeschi) Discussion.......................................................................................... 216 (Francesca Ervas) Chapter Ten ............................................................................................. 221 Evolutionary Psychology and Morality: The Renaissance of Emotivism? (Mario De Caro) Discussion.......................................................................................... 232 (Annalisa Paese) Chapter Eleven ........................................................................................ 237 Between Data and Hypotheses (Emiliano Ippoliti) Discussion.......................................................................................... 262 (Fabio Sterpetti) -/- Section III: Logic and Mathematics -/- Chapter Twelve ....................................................................................... 273 Dedekind Against Intuition: Rigor, Scope and the Motives of his Logicism (Michael Detlefsen) Discussion.......................................................................................... 290 (Marianna Antonutti) Chapter Thirteen...................................................................................... 297 Mathematical Intuition: Poincaré, Polya, Dewey (Reuben Hersh) Discussion.......................................................................................... 324 (Claudio Bernardi) Chapter Fourteen ..................................................................................... 329 On the Finite: Kant and the Paradoxes of Knowledge (Carl Posy) Discussion.......................................................................................... 358 (Silvia Di Paolo) Chapter Fifteen ........................................................................................ 363 Assimilation: Not Only Indiscernibles are Identified (Robert Thomas) Discussion.......................................................................................... 380 (Diego De Simone) Chapter Sixteen ....................................................................................... 385 Proofs and Perfect Syllogisms (Dag Prawitz) Discussion.......................................................................................... 403 (Julien Murzi) Chapter Seventeen ................................................................................... 411 Logic, Mathematics, Heterogeneity (Emily Grosholz) Discussion.......................................................................................... 427 (Valeria Giardino) -/- Contributors........................................................................................ ..... 433 Index............................................................................................... ......... 437 -/- Price Uk Gbp: 49.99 Price Us Usd: 74.99. 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Rationality, Symbolism and EvolutionThe Nature of Rationality By Robert Nozick Princeton University Press, 1993. Pp. xvi + 226. ISBN 0–691–07424–0. £19.95No Nonsense RightsThe Realm of Rights By Judith Jarvis Thomson Harvard University Press, 1990. Pp. viii + 383. ISBN 0–674–74948–0. £27.95.In Search of the Common MindThe Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society and Politics By Philip Pettit Oxford University Press, 1993. Pp. xvi + 365. ISBN 0–19–507818–7. £30.In elucidation of the common mind: a reply to Raimo TuomelaRealism, Pure (...) and Simple? A Reply to Timothy Williamson. (shrink)

The theory of the firm did not exist, in any serious manner, until around 1970. Only then did the current theory of the firm literature begin to emerge, based largely upon the work of Ronald Coase and to a lesser degree Frank Knight. It was work by Armen Alchian, Robert Crawford, Harold Demsetz, Michael Jensen, Benjamin Klein, William Meckling and Oliver Williamson, among others, that drove the upswing in interest in the firm among mainstream economists. This accessible book (...) provides a valuable overview of the prehistory of the firm. Spanning an impressive timeline, it delves into Antiquity, the Medieval era, the pre-classical economics period and the 19th and 20th centuries. Next, the book traces the theoretical contributions from pre-classical, classical and neoclassical economics. It will be illuminating reading for students and researchers of the history of economic thought, industrial organization, microeconomic theory and business history. (shrink)

A festschrift for Dorothy Edgington, containing contributions from Cleo Condoravdi, Dorothy Edgington, Kit Fine, Alan Hájek, John Hawthorne, Sabine Iatridou, Nick Jones, Rosanna Keefe, Angelika Kratzer, David Over, Daniel Rothschild, Robert Stalnaker, Scott Sturgeon, and Timothy Williamson.

Timothy Williamson gives an original and provocative treatment of deep metaphysical questions about existence, contingency, and change, using the latest resources of quantified modal logic. Contrary to the widespread assumption that logic and metaphysics are disjoint, he argues that modal logic provides a structural core for metaphysics.

The second volume in the _Blackwell Brown Lectures in Philosophy_, this volume offers an original and provocative take on the nature and methodology of philosophy. Based on public lectures at Brown University, given by the pre-eminent philosopher, Timothy Williamson Rejects the ideology of the 'linguistic turn', the most distinctive trend of 20th century philosophy Explains the method of philosophy as a development from non-philosophical ways of thinking Suggests new ways of understanding what contemporary and past philosophers are doing.

This chapter lays out a case that with the proper perspective on the place of epistemology within normative inquiry more generally, it is possible to appreciate what was on the right track about some of the early approaches to the analysis of knowledge, and to improve on the obvious failures which led them to be rejected. Drawing on more general principles about reasons, their weight, and their relationship to justification, it offers answers to problems about defeat and the conditional fallacy (...) that plagued early defeasibility analyses of knowledge and offers a sketch of a contemporary alternative that is motivated by the idea that knowledge requires the right kind of “match” between objective and subjective factors. (shrink)

Knowledge and its Limits presents a systematic new conception of knowledge as a kind of mental stage sensitive to the knower's environment. It makes a major contribution to the debate between externalist and internalist philosophies of mind, and breaks radically with the epistemological tradition of analyzing knowledge in terms of true belief. The theory casts new light on such philosophical problems as scepticism, evidence, probability and assertion, realism and anti-realism, and the limits of what can be known. The arguments are (...) illustrated by rigorous models based on epistemic logic and probability theory. The result is a new way of doing epistemology and a notable contribution to the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

An interview with Timothy Williamson on Modality and other matters. Williams is asked three main questions: the first about the difference between philosophical and non-philosophical knowledge, the second concerns the epistemology of modality, and the third is on the emerging metaphysical picture.

Without question, UFOs are part of popular culture; indeed, one might even talk of them as a popular culture. Without question, Roswell is part of the UFO scene; but it is far from the whole thing, nor is it even the central issue. Still less did the Roswell “culture” spawn humankind's preoccupation with possible alien visitors from outer space or the literary genre of science fiction. Yet if this book is to be believed, Roswell has been the center from which (...) these and yet more matters arose: “through the early years, the single event of Roswell, even without a crumb of proof, augmented every image, word, and sound produced by the mass media” . To call this an enormous overstatement would be a large understatement.Little Gray Men is unfortunately full of such sweeping assertions, so broad as to be implausible on their face and yet unsupported by argument or evidence. Toby Smith even defines popular culture as “communication that may be informative but that principally provides pleasure for the participants” , a description that many scholars of culture or communication might find arguable. Some assertions are not only sweeping but puzzling as well—for example, reference to “the Pavlovian nature of popular culture” or a “rhomboidal, zinc‐tinted” television set . Many more examples can be found without venturing beyond the book's introduction.Chapter 1 asserts that Roswell is “a touchstone for our times.” Chapter 2 is about the rocket pioneer Robert Goddard, who does have a connection to Roswell “the Place” but a most tenuous connection to Roswell “the Incident,” which is supposedly the theme of the book. The UFO Encounter gathering at Roswell in 1997 is described in Chapter 3, and the allegation that Roswellian aliens were transported to Wright‐Patterson Air Force Base constitutes Chapter 4. Books about the Incident are mentioned in Chapter 5, films in Chapter 7, science fiction on television in Chapter 8; in between, Chapter 6 is about the science fiction writer Jack Williamson, whose connection to the Incident is less than noteworthy.The book has no formal bibliography or specific notes, though there is a short chapter entitled “Sources.” Thus, when one reads on page 2 “A book came out, in 1980,” there is no quick or easy way to find out what that book is. So Little Gray Men is not a scholarly book. It is in fact a grab bag of trivia connected, not substantively, but only semantically, through the name “Roswell.”As a piece of journalism, one might describe the book as impressionistic, were it not so misleading. No one could gather from Little Gray Men that the popular culture of ufology has a serious side to it, that competent scientists and social scientists have concerned themselves with issues arising from claims about UFOs in general and, in some small part, from claims about the Roswell incident. It is as though one chose to write about the popular culture of cancer by gathering trivia about cranks, quacks, and survivors while saying nothing about mainstream treatments or the underlying scientific knowledge.Ufology has a vast literature, some of it the give‐and‐take of quite disciplined controversy among competent and informed people. That this book has been entirely ignored by ufologists illustrates that it is, in Wolfgang Pauli's phrase, “not even wrong.”. (shrink)